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The ICC has come under sustained attacks for a disproportionate focus on crimes in
Africa, discrediting the Court’s mandate amid accusations of bias. By looking inwardly
and by actualising the ‘complementarity principle’, the new Chief Prosecutor Karim
Khan has an opportunity to strengthen municipal criminal courts’ capacity for trying
atrocity crimes, which could thereby enhance the legitimacy of the ICC as the Court of
last resort.
Since its inception in July 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC) faced criticism on claims
that it had only concentrated its investigations in Africa. While the Court has now opened
investigations beyond the continent, it is time the new Prosecutor QC Karim Khan looked
inwardly and, speci cally, prioritised the ‘complementarity principle’ – where a case is
inadmissible if it is under investigation by a state with jurisdiction over it. Indeed, the ICC, as
premised in its founding Statute, is a court of last resort.
In its many cases and situations, the Court has, however, remained at the centre-stage of
investigations, oftentimes relegating the complementarity principle that asserts the centrality
of municipal criminal courts. As a result, State Parties and non-State Parties under
investigation by the Court have abrogated their core responsibility of prosecuting international
crimes via municipal criminal courts, amounting to an obvious dereliction of judicial obligation.
The complementarity principle, as de ned by the Statute, does not envision a situation where
national jurisdictions will halt investigations and prosecutions and relegate and/or delegate
their sovereign mandate to the ICC. Considering the gravity of atrocity crimes, the
complementarity principle envisions a situation where the ICC would prosecute perpetrators
who hold the highest culpability, while national criminal jurisdictions would perhaps prosecute
other perpetrators who may not. Per the statute, the ICC should only exercise jurisdiction when
states are unwilling or unable to investigate and prosecute using their national criminal
systems. In con ict settings where the ICC has opened cases, alleged perpetrators who were
not identi ed to have held the highest culpability by the Court have on many occasions not
been prosecuted by national criminal jurisdictions, amounting to miscarriages of justice.
Luis-Moreno Ocampo’s political test in Kenya
When the ICC opened the two cases in March 2010, following the electoral con ict in 2007-8,
the Kenyan state had made deliberate attempts to prosecute the perpetrators. The
domestication of the Rome Statute through the enactment of the International Crimes Act
2008 depicted attempts by Kenya to cooperate with the ICC, besides amendments to other
legal frameworks including the Witness Protection Act 2010. The failure of Parliament to enact
the Special Tribunal for Kenya, as recommended in the Judge Philip Waki-led Commission of
Inquiry on Post Election Violence report, paved the way for the ICC process in the country.
The O ce of the Prosecutor, led by Luis-Moreno Ocampo, opened the case of Kenya proprio
motu, which relegated the complementarity principle as there were no national criminal
jurisdictions ongoing by the time the Court opened the cases. Ocampo promised that ‘Kenya
will be a world example on managing violence’ – remarks that gained support in the country.
Municipal criminal courts, however, relegated their initial efforts to investigate the perpetrators,
including mechanisms such as the International Crimes Division of the High Court of Kenya set
to try international crimes. The eventual withdrawal and vacation of charges by the ICC, in the
two cases in 2015 and 2016, respectively, brought to a halt the quest for justice for victims and
perpetrators.
Fatou Bensouda in the Côte d’Ivoire
The opening of the case in Côte d’Ivoire in 2015, following atrocities committed during the
2011 electoral con ict by supporters of President Alassane Ouattara and forces loyal to former
President Laurent Gbagbo, depicted how the complementarity principle might perhaps be best
tested. Following a referral by the UNSC, Bensouda’s opening of the Gbagbo case and the
subsequent acquittal decision in January 2019, which was appealed in September 2019 with
the acquittal con rmed in March 2021, demonstrates why the complementarity test may need
revisiting. Where the ICC fails to successfully prosecute perpetrators holding the highest
culpability, it must be ensured that victims of atrocity crimes  nd remedy through
complementary municipal criminal court mechanisms.
While the municipal courts in Côte d’Ivoire initiated investigations that led to prosecutions, for
instance in the case of senior politician Simone Gbagbo, her eventual acquittal by an Ivorian
court over crimes against humanity charges, as well as the general amnesty served to her and
other members of the Ivorian Popular Front party by President Ouattara, shows how municipal
courts may be in ltrated by amnesty petitions even in situations where perpetrators are
accused of committing atrocity crimes. Such amnesties for perpetrators of atrocity crimes,
while meant to advance peace and reconciliation in post-con ict settings like in Côte d’Ivoire,
may be a contradiction of jus cogens norms.
Looking beyond Africa?
More recently, the O ce of the Prosecutor’s effort to cast its net beyond situations in Africa
has re-invigorated the Court’s ‘international’ outlook. This followed initial calls questioning the
legitimacy of the ICC, for instance, when South Africa, Burundi and The Gambia deposited their
noti cations for withdrawal from the Rome Statute in 2016 and in 2017, as well as the African
Union’s non-binding decision at the Annual Heads of States Summit in Addis Ababa in February
2017 that called for mass withdrawal of members.
African members in the ICC’s oversight body, the ASP, argued about Africanisation of the Court,
critiquing it for remaining non-committal in opening up cases in situations where the West has
openly committed atrocity crimes – for instance the US interventions in Afghanistan (2001-),
Iraq (2003-), Syria (2011-) and Libya (2011-). Israel’s continued occupation and the associated
atrocities committed in the Palestinian Authority territories further illuminates concerns raised
by the African states in the ASP that the ICC is ‘unable’ or ‘unwilling’ to institute investigations
in situations triggered by the powerful Western regimes and their allies.
The lobbying for reforms of the Court may have nevertheless contributed to the opening of
investigations beyond Africa, for instance in Georgia (2016), Afghanistan (2017), Palestine
(2018) and Bangladesh/Myanmar (2019) – the latter case was also  led by The Gambia at the
International Court of Justice. This has debunked the accusations of bias championed by the
African Union in Addis Ababa, and by political commentators in Nairobi, which alleged that the
Court is an imperial agency for political colonialism.
The complementarity principle as a route to legitimacy
While the Court has opened more cases beyond Africa, the ICC success will be de ned not
only by the cases it has effectively investigated but also by the number of legitimate cases it
has not, which have successfully been investigated by municipal criminal courts through the
complementarity principle. Instead of opening more investigations, the Court should perhaps
review its tact and work towards revitalising municipal criminal courts to strengthen internal
structures for their own investigations and prosecutions of atrocity crimes, with a view to
actualising the complementarity principle.
Claims of non-cooperation and witness interference, as argued for instance in the situation in
Kenya, demonstrate how the Court can lead to miscarriages of justice, especially in situations
where municipal courts fail to initiate complementary investigations. While these cases are
pivotal in its mandate, the Court could work towards initiating outreach programmes with State
Parties to enhance judicial reforms of municipal courts. Although supporting municipal judicial
reforms may redirect the Court from its perceived core obligation, i.e. investigating and
prosecuting mass atrocity crimes, at present the Court lacks su cient technical resource
capacity to investigate and timely prosecute the many protracted cases already straining its
system, not to mention new settings of atrocity crimes in the international system.
The Court should hence look inwardly by partnering with State Parties to strengthen municipal
criminal courts to independently investigate and prosecute alleged perpetrators of atrocity
crimes. Only as a last resort should the Court open new investigations. Revitalising the Court’s
cooperation framework with the UN will be essential for this endeavour, perhaps by
incorporating the Responsibility to Prevent element of the Responsibility to Protect regime in
its outreach structures with a view towards averting atrocity crimes.
Photo: ICC Bar Association President Karim Khan moderating the Closing Panel at the ICTY
Legacy Symposium. Credit: UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
Licensed under CC BY 2.0.
About the author
Posted In: Human Rights | International Affairs | Recent
Muema Wambua is the author of ‘Historical Injustices and Transitional Justice
Interventions in Kenya: Victims’ and Interveners’ Experiences and Perceptions’ Journal of
the British Academy, 9(s2): 75-102 (2021), ‘Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding: The
ICC and TJRC Processes in Kenya’ African Con ict and Peacebuilding Review, 9(1): 54–71
(2019), and ‘The Ethni cation of Electoral Con icts in Kenya: Options for Positive Peace’
African Journal on Con ict Resolution, 17(2): 9–40 (2017). @MuemaWambuaPhD
Muema Wambua
